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  The State is correct in its concession, notwithstanding I.C. § 19-1605,1
because the Court’s inherent power of supervision controls over a statutory
proscription on the limits of that authority. Idaho Const. Article V § 13 provides
that “[t]he legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any
power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department of the
government[.]” See e.g., In re Kaufman, 69 Idaho 297, 315, 206 P.2d 528, 539 (1949)
(Statute which provided that residents of the state who graduated from the
University of Idaho School of Law were entitled to be admitted as attorneys without
examination found to be an “invasion of the judicial power and violative of the
constitutional provisions establishing the separate branches of government and
prohibiting the legislature from invading the judiciary.”).
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II.  ARGUMENT IN REPLY
 A.  The Court Has Supervisory Powers to Dismiss an Indictment with
Prejudice for Prosecutorial Misconduct and the District Court Abused its
Discretion in Denying the Request to Do So.
The State concedes the district court possessed the supervisory authority to
dismiss with prejudice.   It only contends that the court did not abuse its discretion1
in failing to exercise that authority, writing that the “[a]pplication of the relevant
legal standards shows that the district court properly dismissed without prejudice
where the only error was that one of the grand jurors was not qualified[.]”  State’s
Brief, pg. 5. However, that was not the “only error” before the grand jury.  The
Prosecutor also allowed more than one unqualified juror to remain and then she
presented false testimony to the grand jury and also withheld exculpatory evidence. 
The court failed to acknowledge and consider these errors when considering the
proper remedy.  Thus, the court abused its discretion because it did not act
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to it
nor did it reach its decision by an exercise of reason.  See State v. Schall, 157 Idaho
2
488, 491, 337 P.3d 647, 650 (2014), quoting Sun Valley Potato Growers, Inc. v. Texas
Refinery Corp., 139 Idaho 761, 765, 86 P.3d 475, 479 (2004).
1.  The court did not correctly perceive the issue as one of discretion.
More fundamentally, the court abused its discretion because it did not
perceive the issue as discretionary.  The Erlebachs argue that this was shown by
the court’s citation to I.C.R. 48 in its order dismissing the case without prejudice.  R
(44468/44469) 329; R (44470) 136.  The State asserts that “[t]he record establishes
that the district court was aware it could dismiss with prejudice, but simply
declined to do so and instead dismissed under I.C.R. 48.”  State’s Brief, pg. 10. 
Notably, the State does not cite to the portion of the record which “establishes” the
court’s awareness.
In fact, the record shows the court was not aware.  The authority for the court
dismissing the case for the absence of twelve qualified grand jurors is found at
I.C.R. 6.7(b):
A motion to dismiss the indictment may be granted by the district
court upon . . . [a] valid challenge to an individual juror who served
upon the grand jury which found the indictment; provided, the finding
of the valid challenge to one or more members of the grand jury shall
not be grounds for dismissal of the indictment if there were twelve or
more qualified jurors concurring in the finding of the indictment.
This was the precise reason why the court dismissed the indictment.  It found that
one of the jurors was not qualified to serve, leaving only eleven qualified jurors.  R
(44468/44469) 318; R (44470) 126.  Rule 6.7 does not restrict the district court to
dismissals without prejudice while felony cases dismissed under Rule 48(a) are
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without prejudice.  I.C.R. 48(c).  If the court understood it had the authority to
dismiss with prejudice it would have dismissed under the specific rule.  Thus, the
record actually shows the court did not understand it had discretion to dismiss with
prejudice because it dismissed pursuant to a general rule which only allows
dismissal without prejudice in felony cases when the specific rule allows for
dismissal with or without prejudice. 
The trial court’s failure to properly identify and apply the law to the facts
found was an abuse of discretion.  S. Idaho Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Astorquia, 113
Idaho 526, 528, 746 P.2d 985, 987 (1987).
2. The court did not act consistently with the legal standards applicable to
the specific choices available to it.
The Erlebachs further argue that, even if the court understood the
boundaries of its discretion, it still did not act consistently with the legal standards
applicable to it.  The State does not respond to this argument.
In order to properly exercise its discretion, the court was required to consider
the scope of the prosecutorial misconduct in the grand jury proceedings and the
prejudice to the Erlebachs which resulted from that misconduct.  See State v.
Marsalis, 151 Idaho 872, 876, 264 P.3d 979, 983 (Ct. App. 2011) (factors which
should be considered when considering dismissing an indictment).  By not
considering the prosecutorial misconduct claims, the court abused its discretion.  S.
Idaho Prod. Credit Ass’n v. Astorquia, supra.
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3.  The court did not reach its decision by an exercise of reason.
Because it did not believe it had discretion to dismiss with prejudice, the
court did not engage in any “reasoning,” i.e., the process of deciding the question in
a logical way, beyond simply applying Rule 48.  Thus did not reach “its decision by
an exercise of reason.”  Even if it understood it could dismiss with prejudice, the
court still did not engage in any reasoning because it did not consider the claims of
prosecutorial misconduct and resultant prejudice.  
B.  The District Court Erred in Failing to Make Findings of Facts
Regarding Prosecutorial Misconduct and Resultant Prejudice.
Idaho Criminal Rule 12(f) states, “[w]here factual issues are involved in
determining a motion, the court shall state its essential findings on the record.” 
When required by court rule, “[t]he absence of findings and conclusions may be
disregarded by the appellate court only where the record is clear, and yields an
obvious answer to the relevant question.” Maxfield v. State, 108 Idaho 493, 497, 700
P.2d 115, 119 (Ct. App. 1985) (interpreting requirement of findings of fact under
I.C. § 19-4907(a) and I.R.C.P. 52(a)) quoting, Pope v. Intermountain Gas Co., 103
Idaho 217, 225, 646 P.2d 988, 996 (1982) (emphasis original).
The State responds that “[t]here is no reason to think that any relevant facts
were omitted from the district court’s analysis.”  State’s Brief, pg. 11.  But that is
not the case. Assuming arguendo that the court understood it had the discretion to
dismiss with prejudice, the Erlebachs presented evidence of prosecutorial
misconduct and argued it justified dismissal with prejudice.  In order to resolve that
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issue, the court had to make factual findings regarding the existence and nature of
the prosecutorial misconduct or conclude that even if all the alleged misconduct
occurred that it still did not justify dismissal with prejudice.  It did neither,
notwithstanding the Erlebachs’ request that the court make findings of
fact.  Absent those findings it is impossible to determine whether the court acted
consistently with the legal standards applicable to the decision or whether its
decision was made by the exercise of reason, even if we assume it understood the
ruling called for the exercise of discretion.
The State’s citation to Herrera v. Estay, 146 Idaho 674, 680, 201 P.3d 647,
653 (2009) and Vanderford Co. v. Knudson, 144 Idaho 547, 554, 165 P.3d 261, 268
(2007), do not aid its cause.  In Vanderford, the trial court issued an order which
“cite[d] to findings of fact made by the jury and [made] further findings.” Id. 
Further, “the transcript of the hearing [made] it clear that the decision . . . was
based on the jury’s findings.”  Id.  Vanderford is easily distinguishable as there were
no findings regarding the multiple instances of prosecutorial misconduct here.  Nor
does the hearing transcript or the court’s order dismissing without prejudice make it
clear that the court was basing its order on unstated findings about the misconduct.
Herrera supports the Erlebachs.  There, the Supreme Court vacated a grant
of summary judgment where the trial court did not consider some evidence
contained in an affidavit and failed to not identify the evidence that it excluded or
identify the reasons for its ruling or rulings.  The Court found that it was “simply
unable to fulfill its function as a reviewing court and determine whether the trial 
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court has acted within the bounds of its discretion.”  Id.  The same is true here.  
The court’s order that the dismissal is without prejudice should be vacated
and the case should be remanded for findings and reconsideration in light of those
findings.
C.  The Record Shows That the District Court Erred in Dismissing the
Indictment Without Prejudice.
The Erlebachs argue that this Court need not go any further in order to
vacate and remand for further proceedings in the district court.  But if this Court
decides to engage in fact-finding, the evidence shows that the Prosecutor engaged in
substantial misconduct which justifies dismissal with prejudice.  
1.  Prosecutorial misconduct by allowing biased grand jurors to sit and by
allowing a grand jury of less than twelve unbiased jurors to return the 
indictment.
The Prosecutors left three jurors on the panel who were not impartial and
then secured an indictment from a jury with only nine unbiased members.  The
court found that one of them was not an unbiased juror and that was sufficient for a
dismissal without prejudice.  Notably, the court stated that the State seemed to
value its convenience over the constitutional rights of the Erlebachs. R
(44468/44469) 318; R (44470) 126.  The court declined to address whether the other
two were qualified. R (44468/44469) 317; R (44470) 125.  The State responds that
the lack of twelve qualified jurors was remedied by the dismissal without prejudice
even if there were other unqualified jurors.  State’s Brief, pg. 12.  That is not correct
because the intentional misconduct of the Prosecutor by obtaining an indictment
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with as few as nine qualified jurors is part of a pattern of prosecutorial misconduct
so egregious that it should be sanctioned.  The Prosecutor wanted an indictment
that day.  She knew that having a co-worker of one of the victims on the grand jury
would help achieve that goal and if there was one or two other unqualified jurors
present so much the better.  That is sanctionable misconduct.  
But even if the Prosecutor did not intentionally impanel biased jurors and
was merely indifferent to whether Jurors 11 and 19 were qualified such conduct still
constituted reckless disregard for the Erlebachs’ constitutional and statutory rights. 
See United States v. Chapman, 524 F.3d 1073, 1085 (9  Cir. 2008) (ruling “flagrantth
misbehavior” may include “reckless disregard for the prosecution’s constitutional
obligations.”).  The Erlebachs have a right to a Grand Jury with at least twelve
qualified jurors.  Idaho Const. Art. 1, § 8; I.C. § 19-1401.  The Prosecutor was the
only one in the proceedings who could ensure that only qualified jurors were
permitted to deliberate, but she disregarded her obligation to due process and fair
play and intentionally obtained an invalid indictment. 
This Court should find, based upon the totality of the prosecutorial
misconduct, that the Prosecutor knew she would not be able to show probable cause
before a neutral and detached magistrate and decided to proceed before an invalid
grand jury in order to oppress the Erlebachs and intimidate them from filing
lawsuits against the police for excessive use of force during their arrests.  Such a
misuse of the grand jury process is a serious threat to the integrity of the judicial
process and calls for the exercise of the Court’s supervisory power to dismiss the
  In addition to requirement under the I.C.R. 6.2(a) to present evidence which2
directly negates the guilt of the subject, I.R.P.C. 3.3(d) states that “[i]n an ex parte
proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the
lawyer that will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not
the facts are adverse.”  (Emphasis added.)  
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Indictments with prejudice. 
2.  Prosecutorial misconduct by presenting false evidence and withholding 
exculpatory evidence. 
The Erlebachs have set forth the evidence showing the Prosecutor presented
false evidence and withheld exculpatory evidence.  Opening Brief, pg. 6-8; 28-33. 
The State argues that “[t]he district court necessarily rejected this argument
because it did not order that the state present any different evidence before the
grand jury if it sought re-indictment.”  State’s Brief, pg. 12.  But the State’s
conclusion does not follow.  First, it assumes the court considered the evidence of
prosecutorial misconduct when there is no indication in the record it did so.  To the
contrary, the court’s failure to issue findings of fact even after a specific request
indicates the court did not weigh the evidence.  Second, the State assumes the court
would issue directions to the prosecutor if it had found misconduct.  However, there
is no requirement the court do so, nor does I.C.R. 6.7 (or even Rule 48) give the
court authority to fashion any remedy other than dismissal.
Next the State argues that the withheld evidence does not meet the I.C.R.
6.2(a) standard, which states that the Prosecutor “must disclose” “substantial
evidence which directly negates the guilt of the subject of the investigation[.]”  That2
is a frivolous argument because the State withheld Kimberley Butler’s testimony
  Q.  When he said that, what he was intending to do after he had pulled3
your shorts and underwear aside, did he do anything physically at that point?
A.  No. No.
. . . . 
Q.  When he -- when he -- when you were on the couch and he pushed your
underwear and your boxers to the side, did he have any contact with your
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that she did not believe Tyrell had attempted to rape her.  The State did not elicit
that testimony during her examination before the grand jury, notwithstanding the
video recordings of the police interviews where she repeatedly stated that Tyrell had
not attempted to rape her.  Key Video (State Exhibit 1), at 14:15 - 15:29; 21:00-
21:15; Laurenson Video (State Exhibit 2) at 22:04.  That evidence directly negates
the guilt of Tyrell regarding the attempted rape charge and should have been
presented to the grand jury.
Instead of presenting Kimberley’s exculpatory evidence, the State put on the
false testimony of Officer Key that Kimberley “said that Tyrell had attempted to
force himself on her but hadn’t actually succeeded in doing so.”  GJT, pg. 82, ln. 9-15
The State protests that Officer’s Key’s characterization of “K.B.’s statement that
Tyrell had tried to remove her underwear without her permission while naked and
threatening to show her what his penis would do . . . was both accurate and
reasonable.”  State’s Brief, pg. 15 ft. 5.  However, the State’s characterization of
Kimberley’s statements is as inaccurate as Officer Key’s testimony.  Kimberley did
not say “Tyrell had tried to remove her underwear[.]” Id.  She said Tyrell “pulled my
underwear to the side.”  GJT, pg. 19, ln. 17.  She then testified that Tyrell did not
try to force himself on her.    In addition, Kimberley told Officer Key that Tyrell3
vaginal area?
A.  No.
Q.  So he just kind of grabbed your underwear and boxers and pushed them
to the side but he didn’t touch in any way, shape or form your genitals?
A.  No.
GJT, pg. 21, ln. 4 - pg. 22, ln. 14. 
  The State makes no attempt to justify the use of the false testimony from4
Chuck Howard in support of the attempted strangulation count.
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“didn’t do anything, anywhere[.]”  Key Video (State Exhibit 1), at 14:15 - 15:29.  She
later denied that Tyrell tried to rape her.  Key Video, at 21:00-21:15.  And later she
said, “I don’t think attempted rape.”  Laurenson Video (State Exhibit 2) at 22:04.  In
fact, the Officer’s testimony was both inaccurate and unreasonable.4
The Prosecutor also failed to show the body cam videos of the incident.  If she
had done so, the Grand Jury would have seen evidence showing that Tyrell never
hit or kicked the police officers.  The State’s assertion, without precise citation to
the record, that “the photographic and video evidence corroborates the testimony of
the witnesses,” is not true.  Compare State’s Brief, pg. 13 (no citation to portions of
record) with Opening Brief, pg. 28-33 (to-the-second citations to the video record). 
See e.g., Key Video #2 7:34 (Officer Yates asks Officer Keys if he was hit, Officer
Keys responds: “if I got hit it was in the vest.  I don’t even know.”)  The video
evidence from three different viewpoints shows that Tyrell never punched or kicked
either officer. And while it would seem to go without saying, evidence showing there
was no battery on either law enforcement officer directly negates Tyrell’s guilt on
the two counts of Battery on a Law Enforcement Officer. 
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Further, the videos show that Bruce only engaged Officer Yates after his son
was unnecessarily tased for a second time and then only acted to protect Tyrell from
the officers’ use of unconstitutional excessive force.  This directly negates Bruce’s
guilt because battery of any type requires an unlawful touching.  I.C. § 18-903.  The
videos show that the touching of the officer was not unlawful because it was done in
the reasonable defense of his son.  I.C. § 19-203 (“Any other person, in aid or defense
of the person about to be injured, may make resistance sufficient to prevent the
offense.”); State v. Lusby, 146 Idaho 506, 509, 198 P.3d 735, 738 (Ct. App. 2008) (a
person may resist the use of unreasonable force by the police); see also, State v.
Wilkerson, 114 Idaho 174, 178, 755 P.2d 471, 475 (Ct. App.), aff'd, 115 Idaho 357,
766 P.2d 1238 (1988) (same).
3.  The Erlebachs were prejudiced by the misconduct
The State concludes its argument by glibly noting that “[t]he Erlebachs will
have ample opportunity” to correct the false evidence and present the exculpatory
evidence at trial.  State’s Brief, pg. 14.  But if an opportunity to exonerate oneself at
a jury trial was all that is needed, we could simply dispense with indictments and
preliminary hearings.  A fair process which separates the good-faith charges based
upon probable cause from those brought for improper reasons or without probable
cause has to exist to prevent the injuries which come from simply defending
criminal charges. 
The opportunity for an acquittal is cold comfort for those who should never
had been indicted for the first place.  The time, effort and expense of posting bond
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and then paying legal counsel to defend this case, even at these very early stages of
the proceedings, have been immense.  The opprobrium of being falsely accused of
attempted rape has cost Tyrell his employment as a physician’s assistant and has
damaged his reputation in the community.  The public shame and scorn of being
falsely labeled a violent sex criminal has caused him anxiety and embarrassment. 
All this could have been avoided had Kimberley been allowed to testify Tyrell never
tried to rape her.  Had the grand jurors seen the audio/video of the illegal arrest and
tasing of Tyrell, they would not have indicted him for either of the Battery of Law
Enforcement counts.  And they would not have indicted Bruce for Battery on a Law
Enforcement Officer because the videos clearly show he was only trying to protect
his son from the excessive force used by the police.  Bruce has also suffered damage
to his reputation and has expended a substantial amount of money to post bond and
pay his lawyers.  Bruce and Tyrell hope this Court finds the State’s cavalier
suggestion that they prove their innocence at trial an inadequate remedy for the
damage the State has caused.
Dismissal of the Indictments with prejudice is justified not only as a sanction
for and a deterrent to future prosecutorial misconduct, but also to release the
Erlebachs from further anguish, embarrassment, expense, and uncertainty. 
III.  CONCLUSION
If the Court decides to examine and weigh the evidence in this case, Tyrell
and Bruce respectfully ask this Court to reverse the district court and remand the
cases with directions to dismiss the indictments with prejudice.  Otherwise, this
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Court should remand the case to the district court for further proceedings under the
correct rule of law with appropriate findings of fact.
Respectfully submitted this 24  day of April, 2017.th
/s/ Dennis Benjamin                        
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Bruce and Tyrell Erlebach
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